The Wall Street
Journal previews this week’s Latin America regional World Economic Forum
meeting in Rio (in addition to its annual meeting in Davos, the WEF hosts
regular regional meetings throughout the year):
“For the economic
elite gathering in Rio de Janeiro on Tuesday at a regional meeting of the World
Economic Forum, the city's hillside slums may loom even closer than usual.
Recent boom years
eased inequalities between the rich and poor. But now Latin America has plunged
into a recession. That has leaders facing two tasks: boosting economic growth
and improving the plight of the region's poor.
Some answers are
starting to emerge. Governments that can afford to are talking up huge
public-works programs in an effort to create jobs while improving roads and
ports. In Brazil, the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
recently unveiled a plan to build one million low-income homes. In nearby
Chile, major spending programs are also under way.
This recession
hasn't plunged Latin countries into unrest. But social conditions remain a
worry. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, sluggish economic
growth in Latin America and the Caribbean could send 2.8 million to 12.7
million people into poverty in the next two years.”
These concerns are more
than justified by the historical record. Global recessions or external shocks often have
been associated with increases in poverty and income inequality in Latin
America (I contributed to some academic research on this topic in the late
1990s, and have written about it recently). Poorer households tend to bear the
brunt of economic shocks and lack the mechanisms available to more wealthy
households to insure against them. The region’s governments historically have
not had the resources, the will, or the appropriate policies to protect poorer
households from these shocks; instead, they often have been forced (by budget
and external constraints) to revert to pro-cyclical fiscal and monetary
policies that ended up exacerbating and deepening the adverse impact on poor
households.
So far, we’ve seen
some signs that this may be a different type of recession for much (but not
all) of Latin America. Many of the region’s governments are credibly testing the limits of
counter-cyclical fiscal and economic policies by reducing policy interest
rates, expanding (or not reducing) overall public spending, and by quickly
putting into place specific targeted policies to minimize the adverse impact on
less-wealthy households.
I continue to
believe that this will be a painful recession for the region – job losses likely
will persist for many more months, and most of the region will experience a
large contraction in GDP in 2009. Moreover, the trend toward a growing consumer
middle class that we’ve seen in Brazil in recent years likely will suffer a
setback. But for much of the region – and especially for Brazil – this
recession may be the region’s first “normal” recession – i.e, it won’t lead to
a full-blown economic and political crisis, and it may not be associated with a
large increase in poverty and inequality. Besides Brazil, I would consider
Chile, Peru, and Colombia (in order of confidence) as the region’s major
economies best-poised to effectively manage the crisis.
This group of countries
best-prepared to manage their way through this recession all used the boom
years from 2004-2007 to build foreign currency reserves, reduce or eliminate
external and foreign currency-denominated debt, and (to a lesser extent)
accumulate some fiscal savings. (Ironically, although the term as fallen way
out of favor in the region, those Latin countries that followed the broad
outlines of the so-called “Washington Consensus” of economic policies are
generally in the best shape today.)
On the other hand,
countries like Venezuela and Argentina appear more vulnerable to a severe crisis
emerging in late 2009 or 2010 – they face relatively more severe external constraints,
lack the credibility to tap global capital markets to borrow, and have had a
contentious relationship with the official lending community (the IMF and other
IFIs). Although their government’s populist rhetoric have favored the poor, if
a serious crisis emerges the poorest households likely will suffer the most. And because the popularity of these governments is based primarily on their ability to deliver real income gains to their constituents, any serious domestic economic cris may quickly become a political crisis.
I’m more on the
fence about Mexico – among the region’s largest economies, in my view it faces
the most daunting longer-term structural challenges. But the Calderon
administration – and the last several governments – have hewed to sensible macro-economic
policies, and Mexico’s economic institutions have accumulated quite a bit of
credibility over the years. Mexico’s recent decision to tap the IMF’s new
credit facility underscores that Mexico – unlike Argentina and Venezuela – will
have as much multi- and bi-lateral support as they desire in the months and
years ahead.
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